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This paper investigates how income inequality affects health. Although a large literature 
has shown that inhabitants in areas with greater income inequality suffer from worse 
health, past  studies  are  severely plagued by inadequate data,  non-random  residential 
sorting and reverse causality. We address these problems using longitudinal population 
hospitalization  data  coupled  with  a  settlement  policy  where  Swedish  authorities 
distributed  newly  arrived  refugee  immigrants  to  their  initial  area  of  residence.  The 
policy was implemented in a way that provides a source of plausibly random variation in 
initial  location.  Our  empirical  analysis  reveals  no  statistically  significant  effect  of 
income inequality on the probability of being hospitalized. This finding holds also when 
investigating  subgroups  more  vulnerable  to  negative  health  influences  and  when 
studying different types of diseases. There is however some indications of a detrimental 
effect on older persons’ health; but the magnitude of the effect is small. Our estimates 
are precise enough to rule out large effects of income inequality on health.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION   
This paper investigates how income inequality affects health. An enormous literature in 
several disciplines has shown that inhabitants in areas with greater income inequality 
suffer from worse health and higher mortality rates (see reviews by e.g. Deaton 2003; 
Leigh, Jencks and Smeeding 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett 2006). The magnitude of the 
estimates in some of these studies is strikingly large. For instance, Lynch et al. (1998) 
find that the annual loss of lives from income inequality in the US is comparable to the 
combined loss of lives from lung cancer, diabetes, motor vehicle crashes, HIV, suicide 
and homicide. If valid, the results suggest that the rising levels of income inequality 
witnessed in many industrialized countries during the past decades (Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 2000) may have far reaching consequences for public health and that policies 
to combat inequality can bring major health benefits to society. This may especially be 
true for many minority groups living in areas characterized by high levels of income 
inequality (Deaton and Lubotsky 2002).   
There are two theories linking income inequality to health. The first is the strong 
income inequality hypotheses which states that inequality itself matters, regardless of an 
individual’s own income level. Several explanations have been suggested for why 
inequality might matter at all income levels. One potential pathway works through 
political influence. Well off individuals are more likely to participate in political 
activities (Benebou 2000). In unequal societies rich individuals pay more to the 
government in terms of taxes than the transfers and services they receive. They may 
therefore support policies that favour less public spending. Among other things this 
could result in worse health care (Kawachi and Kennedy 1997). It has also been 
suggested that inequality erodes social capital (cf. interpersonal trust) and increases the 3 
 
social distance between people, which in turn has been posited to influence health 
through psychosocial stress, self-destructive behaviour and civic involvement (Kaplan et 
al. 1996).  
The weak income inequality hypothesis (also called the relative deprivation 
hypothesis) states that it is an individual’s income relative to his reference group that 
matters. In this framework individuals are assumed to compare themselves to others who 
are more advantaged while ignoring those who are less advantaged. Being relatively 
more disadvantaged is believed to raise psychosocial stress and thereby adversely 
impact health (e.g. Wilkinson 1997; Marmot et al. 1991).
 There is plenty of evidence in 
the biological literature that links relative social status to both physical and mental 
health.
1  
Despite being somewhat vague about the pathways through which inequality 
may influence health, the hypothesis that income inequality matters per se is supported 
by a large empirical literature. Most studies are based on comparisons across countries 
or US states. The studies have been carefully reviewed by e.g. Deaton (2003); Judge, 
Mulligan and Benxeval (1998); Leigh, Jencks and Smeeding (2009); Lynch et al. 
(2004); and Wilkinson and Pickett (2006). The general conclusion is that inequality 
adversely influences health and mortality. For instance, Waldmann (1992) finds that 
greater cross-country inequality is associated with significantly higher infant mortality 
rates. Kaplan et al. (1996) show that US states characterized by high levels of inequality 
have higher mortality rates. Only a few studies find no effect. For example, Leigh and 
Jencks (2007) show that the top decile income share does not affect population health in 
a panel of developed countries.  
                                                 
1 Deaton (2001) and Eibner and Evans (2005) cite several studies. These papers also 
explicitly analyze the relationship between relative deprivation and health.  4 
 
Individual level studies are scarce due to data limitations. Overall, the results in 
individual level studies are weaker than the aggregated area studies (Deaton 2003). 
Lochner et al. (2001), Fiscella and Franks (1997) and Soobander and Leclere (1999) find 
only a small effect of income inequality on mortality and self-reported health. A few 
studies excel in terms of better data or more convincing identification strategy. 
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) use perhaps the richest data to date and are able to 
discriminate between the effect of own income, relative income and income inequality. 
They find that mortality decreases significantly as individual income increases, but there 
is no evidence that relative income differences or income inequality matters for 
mortality in Sweden. Mellor and Milyo (2002) are able to control for unobserved 
regional characteristics using panel data from the US on self-reported health. After 
adjusting for household income and regional level fixed effects they no longer find any 
evidence that inequality affects health.  
There are at least three reasons to be concerned about the results in past empirical 
studies. First, if individual health is a concave function of income, there will be a 
mechanical correlation at the aggregate level between inequality and health even if 
inequality has no effect on health (e.g. Miller 2001). To measure the effect of inequality 
on health it is therefore necessary to adjust for individual income. Since individual level 
data is rare most previous studies have relied on aggregated data and have therefore not 
been able to control for own income. Second, in spite of the advantages with individual 
level studies one problem is that the regional inequality measures used often have been 
estimated from few individual observations. It is possible that this approach generates 
measurement error which biases the estimator downwards (Deaton 2003). Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, the relationship between inequality and health may be 
spuriously driven by non-random sorting of individuals across regions. Alternatively, 5 
 
health could also affect inequality if people with worse health are less able to work and 
therefore have lower earnings (e.g. Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogl 2010). Most 
previous studies control for potential confounders but in the absence of a controlled 
randomized experiment it is impossible to rule out that the observed relationship is not 
driven by omitted variables or reverse causality.  
We circumvent these methodological problems using rich register data coupled 
with a Swedish refugee placement policy where authorities during the years 1985–1994 
assigned newly arrived refugee immigrants to their initial area of residence. The 
institutional setup generates a setting in which it is plausible to assume that initial 
exposure to income inequality is randomly determined conditional on a few key 
individual characteristics. The policy has been used in several previous studies to 
investigate peer and neighborhood effects among immigrants (e.g. Edin, Fredriksson and 
Åslund 2003; Åslund and Fredriksson 2009; Åslund et al. 2011).  
Our data originate from administrative records and cover the entire Swedish 
population age 16–65. The data contain the exact diagnosis on all individuals admitted 
to Swedish hospitals from 1987 to 2004, as well as a wide range of standard individual 
characteristics, income measures, and geographic identifiers. There is also information 
on year of death. We measure income inequality at the municipality level using 
disposable income. We employ several measures: the Gini Coefficient; the Coefficient 
of Variation; the (log) 90 to 10 percentile income ratio. Even though Sweden has a 
compressed income distribution our analysis focuses on a period in which the country 
was hit by a significant economic recession due to a major banking crisis (e.g. Englund 6 
 
1999). The cross-municipal cross-year variation in our data is therefore large and its 
range spans the average Gini Coefficient in countries like the US and the UK.
 2 
3  
Our work offers several innovations over the existing literature. Most 
importantly, this is the first study that uses a source of plausibly random variation in 
exposure to inequality to uncover the causal effect on health. The most convincing 
studies to date have instead relied on panel data to control for regional differences that 
may correlate with inequality and health (e.g. Mellor and Milyo 2002).  
Another advantage is our data. The use of population registers minimizes the risk 
of measurement error both in health and in inequality. To the best of our knowledge only 
a handful of datasets exist that link hospital records to population registers and this is the 
first time that such data are used to study the relationship between income inequality and 
health.
4  
This is also the first paper to explicitly study immigrants. A common feature in 
many immigrant communities is that its members on average suffer from worse health 
and also reside areas with greater income inequality (e.g. Loue 1988).  Even though this 
association does not necessarily imply a causal relationship it suggests one potentially 
important determinant of immigrant health.   
A fourth improvement is that we are able to study whether the potential effect of 
inequality differs across subgroups of the population that may be more or less 
susceptible to negative health influences. We investigate groups that differ in terms of 
education, gender and age. Due to sample size restrictions no previous study has been 
able to do this.   
                                                 
2 The Gini Coefficient in our data varies between .185 and .500. The within municipality 
variation in inequality amounts to about 40 percent of the overall variation. 
3 In the year 2000, for instance, the Gini Coefficient in the US and the UK was about 35 
and 32, respectively (OECD 2005).  
4 Grönqvist (2009) uses similar data to study the effect of segregation on health.  7 
 
Last, many countries, including the US, have in different ways tried to influence 
the settlement decision of their inhabitants. Some of the interventions have been 
evaluated in terms of their health consequences; e.g. the Moving to Opportunity Project 
(Kling, Katz and Liebman 2007) or the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program (Vortuba 
and Kling 2009). Knowledge of how such interventions affect individuals’ general well-
being is of course important from a policy perspective. Our paper also adds to this 
literature.  
The results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in any of our inequality 
measures increases the probability of being hospitalized by between .03 and 1.8 percent. 
This estimate corresponds to between 1/200 and 1/20 of the health gap between 
individuals with compulsory education versus university education. Although not 
statistically significant our estimates are precise enough to rule out that a one standard 
deviation increase in inequality raises the probability of being admitted to hospital by 
more than between 1.9 and 7 percent (between 1/20 and 1/5 of the educational health 
gap). We further find no significant effects investigating different types of diagnoses. In 
most subgroups that we study there is no evidence that inequality affects the risk of 
being hospitalized. There is however some weak evidence of a significant adverse effect 
on older persons’ health; although the magnitude of the effect is small.  
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional background 
surrounding the placement policy and the Swedish health care system. Section 3 
describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 
gives concluding remarks.  
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND    8 
 
This section discusses institutional facts surrounding the settlement policy. We also 
briefly outline the Swedish health care system.  
 
2.1 Migration to Sweden and the settlement policy 
5  
Sweden’s has a relatively large share of immigrants ─ about 14 percent of its 9 million 
residents are foreign-born. Since the 1970s the majority of the immigrants arriving are 
either refugees or family reunification migrants. Over the past decades, the economic 
performance of the migrants has been trending downwards to the extent that Sweden 
today has one of the largest immigrant-native labor market gaps among the OECD 
countries (OECD 2007). There is also a significant health gap between immigrants and 
natives. The probability of being hospitalized was for instance in 1994 almost 9 percent 
higher among immigrants. 
As a way of reducing a strong geographic concentration of immigrants, the 
Swedish government enacted in 1985 a policy to assign newly arrived refugees to an 
initial municipality of residence. Because of the large inflow of asylum seekers in the 
late 1980s, the number of receiving municipalities was increased from 60 to include 277 
of Sweden’s 284 municipalities in 1989. The original idea was to put people in locations 
with good opportunities for providing work or education. However, at the time the 
housing market was booming, which meant that available public housing essentially 
came to determine the location. The policy encompassed all refugees who arrived during 
the period 1985–1994, except for family reunification migrants.  
Following arrival, asylum seekers were placed in refugee centres, while waiting 
for the Immigration Board’s ruling on whether or not to grant a residence permit. The 
centres were distributed all over Sweden and there was no link between the port of entry 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on Åslund et al. (2011).  9 
 
to Sweden and the location of the center. In general, it took between three and twelve 
months to be approved. Upon admission, municipal placement usually occurred 
immediately. Refugee preferences were in some cases considered in the assignment, but 
because of the housing market boom individual requests were in practice given very 
little weight. The refugees were allowed to move if they found housing in another 
location but were still required to take part in an 18-month introduction program in their 
assigned municipality. During the introduction period the migrants received social 
assistance. Eight year after arrival about 50 percent were still living in their assigned 
municipality. The dispersal policy was later abolished due to large increases in the 
number of asylum seekers. In section 3.2 we discuss the arguments for why the 
placement policy provides exogenous variation in initial location.  
 
2.2 The Swedish health care system
6 
The local county councils are the major financiers and providers of Swedish health care. 
There are 25 county councils and each council is obliged to provide its residents with 
equal access to health services and medical care. Health care is mostly financed through 
local taxes. Each county council sets its own patient fees but a national ceiling limits the 
total amount that a patient pays during a 12-month period (out-of-pocket). Thus, patient 
fees only account for about 3 percent of the total revenues. The daily fee for staying at a 
hospital is about USD 15. There is free choice of provider but referral is required in 
some cases, particularly when patients seek specialized care, or when they choose health 
care in another county. The county councils are allowed to contract private providers but 
the majority of the health care is performed by public agents. In their contacts with 
health care providers immigrants are entitled to an interpreter free of charge.  
                                                 
6 This brief outline of the Swedish health care system draws on  the Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities and Regions (2005).  10 
 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY   
3.1 Data and sample selection  
Our empirical analysis exploits micro data originating from administrative registers. The 
dataset, collected and maintained by Statistics Sweden, covers the entire Swedish 
population aged 16–65 during the period 1987–2000, and individuals aged 16–74 from 
2001 through 2004. It contains annual information on a wide range of educational and 
demographic characteristics as well as different income sources.  
Information on hospitalizations was provided by the National Board of Health 
and Welfare and covers all inpatient medical contacts at public hospitals from 1987 
through 1996. This is no major restriction since virtually all medical care in Sweden at 
that time was performed by public agents. From 1997 and onwards the register also 
includes privately operated health care. In order for an individual to be registered with 
an health impairment (s)he must have been admitted to a hospital. As a general rule, this 
means that (s)he has to spend the night at the hospital. However, starting in 2002 the 
registers also cover outpatient medical contacts in the specialized care.   
An important feature of the data is that it contains the cause of each admission. 
The diagnoses, made by physicians, are classified according to the World Health 
Organization’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (ICD). ICD is a four digit coding of diseases and signs, symptoms, abnormal 
findings, complaints, and external causes of injury or diseases.
7 In our analysis we focus 
on several common diseases: ischemic heart disease, respiratory diseases, cancer, mental 
health problems and diabetes. Table A.1. outlines the different types of diagnoses and 
                                                 
7 The underreporting conditional on having been in contact with health care providers is 
very low and estimated to be less than one percent each year. 11 
 
the way they have been constructed. Although the data include possible co-morbidities 
we only use the main diagnosis in our analysis.   
Income is measured using disposable income (in 1990 year’s prices), i.e. the 
universe of net income from work and capital combined with social benefits and 
transfers. The unit of analysis is the individual.
8 We measure inequality for all 
individuals aged 25–65 using three distinct measures: (i) the Gini Coefficient; (ii) the 
Coefficient of Variation; (iii) the (log) 90 to 10 percentile income ratio. These measures 
represent some of the most commonly used ways to quantify inequality (e.g. Atkinson 
1970). The Gini coefficient varies between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete 
inequality). It has several attractive properties one of which is that it is sensitive to 
income disparities throughout the distribution. The coefficient of variation is simply the 
standard deviation divided by its mean. Also this measure incorporates all data 
throughout the distribution. Although each measure has its own shortcomings together 
they should well portray local income inequality.  
We compute these measures for each municipality and year.
9 As discussed by 
Deaton (2003), in doing so we implicitly assume that people only compare themselves 
with individuals living in the same municipality. Even though alternative reference 
groups have been suggested (e.g. age, race or education as in Eibner and Evans 2005) 
the standard approach in the literature is to use geographically constrained groups.
10 
                                                 
8 An alternative solution is to use household income. However, we cannot observe co-
habitants in the data if the co-habiting couple does not have any children in common. 
Since co-habiting is frequent in Sweden this strategy would introduce measurement error. 
Moreover, using the individual as the unit of analysis is not as restrictive in Sweden as it 
may be in other countries because of the high female labor force participation rate.  
9 The average municipality hosts about 30,000 inhabitants.    
10 One alternative would be to measure inequality within municipalities acros s ethnic 
groups (e.g. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000; Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund 
2003). However for small source countries this would mean that our analysis relies on 
very few observations and that our measure of inequality therefore becomes too noisy.     12 
 
Table A.2 displays descriptive statistics for our inequality measures and other selected 
variables.  
We extract all immigrants aged 25–60 that arrived from a refugee sending 
country during the years 1990 to 1994.
11 Some countries have been aggregated due to 
confidentiality. The rationale for starting our analysis in 1990 is that this is when 
information on disposable income first becomes available. We exclude individuals with 
a spouse, child or parent already living in Sweden at the time of immigration since 
family reunification migrants were exempted from the placement policy.  
While our data provide an objective measure of health that is not plagued by self-
report bias and measurement error, one potential problem is that we only have 
information on health for individuals who have been hospitalized. First of all, this means 
that our analysis less likely extends to less severe morbidities. Potentially more serious 
is however that the likelihood of being admitted to hospital, conditional on health, may 
be correlated with local income inequality. This is true if doctors in municipalities with 
greater income inequality are less/more likely to admit patients, or if the inhabitants are 
less/more likely to seek medical care. In this case our estimator may be biased.
 12 
13 In 
section 4.2 we discuss how we deal with this issue.  
 
3.2 Using the settlement policy to identify the effect of inequality on health   
                                                 
11 The placement policy was most strictly enforced in the period 1987 to 1991. In a 
sensitivity analysis we excluded cohorts who arrived after 1991 (results are available on 
request).  Although  the  statistical  precision  decreases  due  to  the  small er  number  of 
observations it is reassuring to find that the estimates are relatively stable and do not alter 
the conclusions in this paper.   
12 This can of course also be a problem in studies using data on self-reported health status 
if greater inequality  for instance generates higher stress levels and thereby decreases an 
individual’s possibilities to correctly assess his health.  
13 The direction of the bias is ambiguous and depends on the correlation between true 
health, observed health, and inequality.     13 
 
To estimate the effect of income inequality on health we exploit the Swedish refugee 
placement policy where authorities assigned newly arrived refugees to their initial 
location of residence. The policy has been carefully documented and used to examine 
the relationship between neighborhoods and immigrants’ socioeconomic outcomes (e.g. 
Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund 2003; Åslund and Fredriksson 2009, Åslund and Rooth 
2007; Åslund et al. 2011). We refer to these studies for a more comprehensive treatment 
of the policy.    
As previously mentioned, the institutional arrangement implied that refugees 
were to be assigned their initial municipality of residence. Past studies provide 
convincing evidence that the policy actually created a geographic distribution that was 
independent of unobserved individual characteristics. For instance, Edin, Fredriksson 
and Åslund (2003) show that the residential area of those placed clearly differed from 
the location choices made by migrants arriving from the same regions shortly before the 
reform.  
Despite this evidence it is important to note that local placement officers had 
information on the refugee and may have tried to match refugees to specific locations. 
Another issue is that refugees were allowed to state residential preferences. There are 
three arguments for why it still is possible to consider initial location as exogenous with 
respect to the unobserved characteristics of the individual. First, there was no direct 
interaction between the local placement officers and individual refugees so any selection 
by placement officers must have been on observed characteristics. Since our 
administrative registers contain the same set of information on the refugee as was 
available to the officer (age, education, gender, marital status, family size, country of 
origin) we are able to control for potential cream skimming. Second, the housing market 
boom severely restricted any residential preferences from being realized (e.g. 14 
 
Fredriksson and Åslund 2009). Finally, the timing of the receipt of the residence permit 
must have coincided perfectly with the arrival of a housing vacancy in the preferred 
location in order for preferences to be realized. Since placement occurred rapidly after 
having received the permit the joint probability of these two events to occur at the same 
time must be considered as extremely low.
14  
It is difficult to test for random assignment since it requires a variable that was 
not observed by the officer (or at least unexploited). Instead we provide results which 
illustrate the differences in how well individual characteristics correlate with properties 
of the local area in the year of arrival versus five years after placement. During this 
period individuals will have had time to change residential area. Consequently, one 
would expect to find a stronger link between the individual and the municipality 
characteristics. Table 1 presents estimates from regressions where the dependent 
variable is some feature of the municipality measured in the year of arrival and then five 
years later. When looking at the results for year of arrival in Panel A we find only 3 out 
of 48 estimates significant at the five percent level. This is just slightly more than what 
we would expect to find by pure chance. When municipality characteristics instead are 
observed five years after placement we can see that 21 out of the 48 estimates are 
significant. These results clearly highlight the importance of accounting for non-random 
selection to uncover the causal effect of income inequality on health.    
To take advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation in initial inequality we 
run regressions of following form by type of diagnosis   
 
(1)   
                                                 
14 Oreopoulos (2003) use a similar argument when studying the effect of neighborhoods 
on adult outcomes for individuals who were assigned to different housing projects in 
Toronto.   15 
 
 
where i denotes individual, k municipality, and t year of arrival.   is a vector of 
individual characteristics controlling for dummies of: age, gender, marital status, 
educational attainment (6 levels) and country of origin; and linearly for disposable 
income (and its square) and number of children.   represents a vector of time-varying 
municipality characteristics controlling for: (the log of) population size, share of 
university educated, and the unemployment rate.   represents municipality fixed 
effects which absorbs all persistent municipal characteristics that may be related to 
health; e.g. access to fitness centers or environmental characteristics of the area.    
denotes year of arrival fixed effects.   is by assumption conditionally independent of 
the covariates in the regression model, we however allow them to be correlated across 
individuals in the same municipality. We estimate models where the outcome is a 
dummy equal to one if the individual has been hospitalized at least once during a five 
years period after arrival. To ensure that our inequality measures are not suffering from 
non-random residential mobility they are dated in the year of immigration.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS   
4.1 Main results  
This section provides the results from our empirical analysis. Our baseline specification, 
given by equation (1), relates the probability of being hospitalized in five years 
following arrival to inequality in the assigned municipality. Throughout, estimates are 
reported for three inequality measures: the Gini Coefficient; the Coefficient of 
Variation; the (log) 90 to 10 income percentile ratio. To conserve space we suppress the 
estimates for the control variables (available on request). In general, these show a 
reduced risk of hospitalization for highly educated individuals, as well as for individuals 16 
 
with more children, married people, younger individuals, and males. Since unobserved 
local factors are quite stable within municipalities over time we estimate the standard 
errors by clustering at the municipality level (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004).  
Table 2 presents our main results. Numbers in brackets provide the effect of a 
one standard deviation increase in inequality on the probability of being hospitalized 
expressed in percent. Estimates are shown for all individuals in our sample (Panel A) 
and by population subgroup (Panels B to D). We focus on groups defined by highest 
completed level of education, gender and age at immigration. The reason is that we wish 
to investigate whether some groups are better or worse at coping with living in a high 
inequality area. Although it is well known that individuals with certain background 
characteristics such as low education are more susceptible to health insults (e.g. Cutler 
and Lleras-Muney and Vogl 2009) previous studies have not been able to investigate 
whether some groups respond differently to inequality.  
In Panel A we can see that there is no statistically significant effect of inequality 
on the probability of being hospitalized for any of our inequality measures. The point 
estimate in column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the Gini 
Coefficient (.031) raises the probability of being hospitalized in five years after arrival 
by .5 percentage points (.163×.031). In relation to the mean of the dependent variable 
this translates into an increase in the order of 1.8 percent. The estimate in column (2) 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the Coefficient of Variation increases 
the likelihood of being admitted to hospital by .08 percentage points (.002×.389), or 
stated differently, by .03 percent. The corresponding numbers for the (log) 90 to 10 
percentile income ratio are .04 percentage points (.027×.147) and 1.4 percent.   
To interpret the magnitude of these estimates it is useful to compare the 
coefficients with the educational health gap. The educational gradient has repeatedly 17 
 
been documented in many different countries and contexts (e.g. Cutler and Lleras-
Muney 2010). In our sample individuals who have completed at least two years of 
university education are 9.5 percentage points less likely to be admitted to hospital in 
five years after arrival compared to individuals that only have finished compulsory 
school. Our estimates therefore suggest that a one standard deviation increase in our 
inequality measures corresponds to only roughly between 1/200 and 1/20 of the 
educational health gap.  
Although not statistically significant, the estimates are precise enough to be able 
to rule out large effects. The upper limit of the 95 percent confidence intervals for our 
inequality measures is: .634, .014 and .144. These intervals suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in inequality increases the probability of being hospitalized by at most 
between 1.9 and 7.6 percent. This constitutes about 1/20 to 1/5 of the educational health 
gap.  
Before proceeding with the analysis note that we study a minority group that 
faces a considerable economic disadvantage.
15 This is important since the theory 
suggests that any detrimental health effects are likely to be more pronounced for the 
least well of in society. Recall that the refugees in our sample were required to take part 
in an introductory program for 18 months during which time they received social 
assistance. Since most of the refugees therefore do not have other incomes than social 
assistance we cannot explicitly investigate whether relative income differences 
                                                 
15 OECD (2007) reports that Sweden is one of the countries with the largest native-




17 Yet, given the population of study our estimates are likely to capture both 
the strong and the weak income inequality hypotheses.  
 It is however possible to investigate whether the effect is stronger for individuals 
with lower income potential as proxied by low education. Panel B displays estimates by 
highest completed level of education. We can see that that there is no statistically 
significant effect of inequality on the probability of being hospitalized for individuals 
that at most have completed high school. Neither is there a significant effect for 
individuals with university education. As for the total sample the estimates are precise 
which makes it possible to rule out large effects.   
Panel C shows results by gender. As we can see, there are no indications that 
income inequality affects the probability of being hospitalized in five years after arrival 
when for men or women.   
In Panel D we split the sample by age at immigration using 40 as cut-off. Since 
young individuals are overrepresented in our sample we choose not to set a higher age 
limit. The results show that there is weak evidence that greater inequality increases the 
risk of being hospitalized among individuals who were at least age 40 when 
immigrating. The point estimate on the Gini Coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. The estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the Gini 
Coefficient raises the probability of being hospitalized by about 2.8 percentage points 
(.031×911). In relation to the mean of the dependent variable this means an 8 percent 
(.028/.346) increase in the probability of being admitted to hospital. For the Coefficient 
                                                 
16 A related issue is that we observe annual disposable income but not the exact date the 
placement occurred. This means that refugees who were placed late (early) in the year 
mechanically will have lower (higher) recorded incomes.  
17 Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) are able to discriminate between the weak and strong 
income inequality hypotheses using Swedish data. They find no evidence for any of the 
hypotheses.  19 
 
of Variation and the (log) 90 to 10 percentile income ratio the estimates are positive and 
just marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level.  
Our data also allows us to separately investigate different diagnoses. We focus on 
some common illnesses which have been highlighted in the past literature as more likely 
linked to inequality (e.g. Wilkinson 1996; 1997). Table 3 presents the results from this 
analysis. It is clear that there is no statistically significant effect. Since the incidence of 
these diagnoses is low the precision of the estimates is not as good as in Table 2. For 
instance, the upper limit of the 95 percent confidence interval suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in the Gini Coefficient raises that likelihood of being 
diagnosed with respiratory diseases by no more than 29 percent. Interesting is however 
that in some cases the sign on the coefficients is actually negative.  
 
4.2 Robustness tests  
Table 4 presents results from other sensitivity tests. Panel A asks whether the results are 
sensitive to how we have specified our regression model. One concern is that, even 
though we have plausibly exogenous variation in initial location, inequality could be 
correlated with other properties of the municipality that affect health. It is however 
important to note that our baseline model controls for all permanent differences across 
municipalities that may correlate with inequality and health. This raises the question if 
there are regional characteristics that change over time that may confound our results. 
To assess whether our results are likely to be driven by unobserved developing local 
factors we drop our set of time-varying municipal covariates: population size, 
unemployment rate and the share university educated. Presumably these variables are 
among the strongest factors linked to inequality and health. Interestingly is therefore that 
our baseline results (in Panel A in Table 2) are relatively stable when dropping these 20 
 
controls. This suggests that other less important unobserved factors are not likely to 
explain our results.  
 Another way to investigate whether the results are sensitive to unobserved local 
shocks is to include county-by-year fixed effects in the regressions. This approach 
absorbs unobserved evolving factors that affect all individuals in a given county; for 
instance, changes in the quality of the local health care.
18 The strategy is quite 
demanding in that it only relies on variation across municipalities within counties to 
identify the effect of inequality. It is reassuring to find that the estimates are stable when 
adding county-by-year fixed effects to our baseline model.   
Remember that our regressions control for individual income and its square. Past 
studies have demonstrated the importance of controlling for own income to account for 
the fact that the aggregated measures of inequality can be mechanically linked to 
inequality (e.g. Miller 2001). In our setting this is not as vital since refugees only 
account for a small fraction of the municipality’s total disposable income. Still, it is 
comforting to find that dropping controls for own income reveal no major changes in the 
point estimates. 
As discussed earlier, one potential concern is that we only have health measures 
for individuals who were admitted to hospital. If there is systematic selection into 
medical care based on local inequality the results may be biased. Fortunately, the 
institutional setting is such that this problem may not be so severe, especially 
considering that we have access to detailed data. The Swedish health care system calls 
for the local county councils to provide its residents with equal access to medical care to 
                                                 
18 Note that we cannot include municipality by year fixed effects since this would remove 
all variation used to identify our parameter of interest. 21 
 
very low fees. This is likely to weaken the financial incentives for selection into medical 
care.  
There may still be some problem with the selection process if not captured by 
our covariates. Our estimation strategy is in this respect quite persuasive. The 
municipality fixed effects account for permanent differences in the quality of the local 
health care as well as the possibility that inhabitants may be more or less likely to seek 
medical care. Ethnic group fixed effects control for potential discrimination by the 
health care system towards specific ethnic groups in addition to any group specific 
differences in the propensity to seek medical care. The year fixed effects absorb annual 
shocks that are common for all individuals and correlates with health and inequality.  
Even though we believe that this is a rather convincing way of dealing with the potential 
problem one could still be concerned that there may be systematic selection into medical 
care based on unobserved local shocks. It is therefore reassuring that our analysis in 
Panel A showed that the estimates are not sensitive to controlling for annual shocks at 
the county level. Since Swedish health care policy is decided at the county level this 
finding suggests that such selection is not likely to be a problem.  
To further show that selection into health care is no cause of concern we use two 
alternative health indicators that are less likely to be plagued by this potential problem. 
The first is the probability of taking long-term sick leave (> 13 days). Sick leave is not a 
perfect proxy for health since there could also be other factors influencing sick leave, for 
instance social norms (e.g. Hesselius, Johansson and Nilsson 2009). Nevertheless, in 
order for an individual in Sweden to receive sick pay it is necessary to see a doctor on 
the seventh day of job absence. Since a doctor’s certificate is required it is reasonable to 
treat sick leave as a health indicator. And because an individual has economic incentives 
to go to the doctor to get the certificate it is less likely that an individual neglects visiting 22 
 
a physician in the case of illness. We have information on sick leave starting in 1993. 
For that reason we cannot observe the outcome over a five year period as we have done 
so far. Instead we investigate the effect of initial inequality on the probability of taking 
out sick-leave in year five after arrival. The results in Panel B show no statistically 
significant effect of inequality on the probability of taking sick leave. These results 
support our earlier findings.   
Because mortality is not likely to be influenced by selection into health care we 
also examine this health indicator. The dependent variable is defined as the probability 
of dying in five years after arrival. Also here we find no statistically significant effect. 
Note however that the mean of the dependent variable is quite low making the estimates 
imprecise.  
We have also experimented with using the average number of days admitted to 
hospital in a five year period after arrival as an outcome. The concern was that we may 
lose valuable information by only examining health at the extensive margin. It is evident 
from the results that there is no statistically significant effect of inequality on the number 
of days spent in hospital care. Note however the negative sign on two of the coefficients.  
One possible objection to our results is that it may take some time for immigrants 
to learn about the nature of inequality in their municipality of residence. To investigate 
if this is the case we have examined if the effect gets stronger later during our 
observation period (results available on request). The results from this exercise suggest 
that this is not the case.  
We also investigated whether there is a non-linear effect of inequality on health 
by adding squared terms to our regression model. Panel C shows no evidence of such a 
relationship.  23 
 
The past literature has raised the question what geographic unit is appropriate to 
measure inequality for (e.g. Deaton 2003). To examine whether our results are sensitive 
to the level of aggregation we experimented with measuring inequality at the parish 
level. There are about 1,500 parishes in Sweden on average hosting about 6,000 
inhabitants. We ran the same set of regressions as in Table 2. The estimates from this 
exercise are very similar to our main results.  
Theory does not teach us what income concept should be used. It is possible that 
social status is more strongly linked to income from work. We investigated this by re-
estimating our models using gross labor earnings to measure inequality. It turns out that 
the results were very similar.    
 
4.3 Estimating the effect of long-term exposure to inequality   
So far, the aim of this paper has been to estimate the “reduced form” (or intention to 
treat) effect of assigned inequality on health. This parameter is especially important for 
policy makers trying to weight the costs and benefits of similar settlement policies. To 
the extent that initial inequality provides a good proxy for individuals’ actual exposure 
over a longer period our estimates also incorporate the impact of long-term exposure to 
inequality. Of course, this is only true as long as individuals do not change residential 
area over time. Even though many of the theoretical foundations of the income 
inequality hypothesis seem to be more applicable for long-term exposure the focus in the 
previous literature has exclusively been on single year measures of inequality and 
health.  
To estimate the effect of actual long-term exposure to inequality we use assigned 
inequality as an instrument for average exposure over a five year period after arrival. As 
before, our outcome of interest is the probability of being hospitalized in a five year 24 
 
period after arrival. One concern with the instrumental variable (IV) approach is 
however that it requires that initial exposure has no direct effect on health other than 
through average exposure. Heckman (2007) and others have argued that inputs in the 
health production functions at different points in time are complementarities. If initial 
exposure to inequality affects the dynamic accumulation of health capital the IV strategy 
is no longer valid. This is true if initial exposure to inequality causes poor health which 
in turn increases the risk of subsequent co-morbidities.  
With this caveat in mind Table 5 presents our IV estimates. As is common in IV 
analyses the statistical precision is rather poor so we are no longer able to rule out large 
effects of inequality on health. If we instead focus on the point estimates we can see that 
a one standard deviation increase in inequality raises the probability of being 
hospitalized in the full sample by between 1.7 and 4.5 percent depending of the 
inequality measure used. The estimates are similar to those in our main results. Also 
when looking at different subgroups the IV estimates resembles our reduced form 
estimates. This is natural since the first-stage relationships are quite strong. For example, 
the coefficient of initial inequality is just below .4. The statistical precision of the first-
stage relationship is good and discards any potential concerns of weak instruments.
19 To 
summarize, even though there is a great deal of uncertainty in our IV estimates the 
coefficients are quite in line with our previous analysis suggesting small health effects.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
A large number of studies have shown that greater income inequality is associated with 
adverse health outcomes. Investigations of this question are complicated due to the 
requirements of high quality individual level data and methods to account for non-
                                                 
19 All estimates are available from the authors upon request.   25 
 
random residential sorting and reverse causality. In this study we address these problems 
using rich administrative hospitalization data together with a settlement policy where 
Swedish authorities distributed newly arrived refugee immigrants to an initial area of 
residence. The policy provides a source of plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to 
inequality that makes it possible to uncover the causal effect on health. In contrast to 
most previous studies we can rule out large effects from inequality on health.  
Given that the findings contradict those in many past studies it is relevant to ask 
whether our results are an artifact of the specific context in which our analysis is 
preformed. In comparison with other countries Sweden has traditionally been considered 
as an egalitarian country (e.g. Aaberge et al. 2002). The country has an extensive 
welfare state, which among other things, encompasses publicly financed health care, 
schools, pensions, elder care, and social services. There are also many different forms of 
income support. Could this institutional setting compensate for the potential detrimental 
effect of inequality on health?   
In this respect it is important to remember that while other studies focus on the 
total population within a community, we study a group that is significantly 
socioeconomic disadvantaged. Many of the theoretical predictions suggest that less 
affluent groups should be more affected by inequality. It is therefore remarkable that we 
find so limited evidence that inequality affects health. Equally noteworthy is that there is 
no effect of inequality on health even when studying individuals with worse 
socioeconomic status (i.e. less education) within this disadvantaged group.   
Still, even though the results are internally valid it is important to bear in mind 
that refugees represent a special group of individuals which might limit the scope of 
generalizing the results to a larger population. One issue for instance is that income 
inequality in the country of origin might have been considerably larger than the level of 26 
 
inequality experienced in Sweden. It is not implausible to think that individuals that 
have been subject to high levels of inequality might not respond to the relatively lower 
levels they are exposed to in Sweden. A related question is that refugees may lack a 
reference group. It is likely that refugees at least initially do not compare themselves to 
native Swedes in their municipality of residence; for instance due to language barriers. 
Even though we examine exposure to inequality over a five year period after arrival this 
time need not be sufficient to allow for an adjustment in the choice of reference group. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper it would certainly be interesting to 
investigate the link between assimilation and potential changes in reference group.      
It is also conceivable that inequality does not matter in a setting where equality 
of opportunity is large. Compared to for instance the US, Sweden has significantly 
higher intergenerational mobility (e.g. Björklund and Jäntti 1997).
20 Although this is 
undeniably an interesting question to explore it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
It is often claimed that income inequality imposes negative external effects on 
society (e.g. Wilkinson 1996). These concerns have been used to motivate the 
introduction or expansion of various kinds of redistributive policies. Although there 
indeed may be some forms of external costs associated with income inequality our 
findings suggest that health is not likely to be one of them.  
                                                 
20 Among immigrants in Sweden there is evidence that the intergenerational transmission 
of education is only slightly higher compared to natives (Niknami 2010). 27 
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Table A.1 Classification of diagnoses included in the analysis  
Type of diagnosis  ICD classification  Common diagnoses 
included in the category 
Respiratory diseases  J00–J99  Asthma, pneumonia 
Mental diseases  F00–F99  Psychosis 
Cancer  C00–D48   
Ischemic heart conditions  I20–I25   Myocardial infarction  
Diabetes  E10–E14   32 
 
 
Table A.2 Summary statistics for selected variables  
Variable  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
Min  Max 
Individual characteristics         
Hospitalized in five years after arrival  .283  .451     
Female  .469  .499     
Married  .723  .447     
Age at immigration  35.80  8.70  25  60 
Number of children  1.30  1.47  0  12 
Compulsory school  .282  .450     
At most two years high school  .138  .345     
At least two years high school  .255  .436     
At most two years university  .134  .340     
At least two years university  .172  .377     
         
(Initial) Regional characteristics          
Gini Coefficient  .244  .031  .185  .500 
Coefficient of Variation  .732  .389  .347  6.122 
log(P90/P10)  1.069  .147  .820  2.019 
Notes: The sample consists of refugee migrants age 25–60 at arrival that immigrated 1990–
1994 (N=66,871). If not stated otherwise all variables are measured in the year of immigration. 
Summary statistics on education is conditional on that information is available.   33 
 
 
Table 1 OLS estimates from balancing tests regressing initial municipal properties 
on individual characteristics   






















  A. Year of arrival 
Age at immigration*10
3     .002 
(.004) 
 .032    
(.130) 




.030   
(.035) 
.002    
(.009) 
Female*10
3    
 
–.033   
(.046) 
.443    
(1.532) 
–.397   
(.206) 
–.243*    
(.101) 
–.319   
(.382) 
.115    
(.112) 
Married*10
3     –.217   
(.175) 
–1.407   
(3.691) 
–.953   
(.946) 
–.239   
(.271) 
.666   
(.921) 
.274    
(.191) 
Number of children*10




.039   
(.194) 
–.189   
(.082) 
–.305   
(.885) 
–.051    
(.068) 
Ref. Compulsory school             
At most two years high 
school*10
3   
.367   
(.192) 
10.94*   
(5.00) 
1.122   
(.831) 
.538   
(.348) 
1.395   
(1.025) 
.296    
(.218) 
At least two years high 
school*10
3   
.161   
(.120) 
.214   
(3.79) 
.452   
(.558) 
.402   
(.219) 
.522    
(.935) 
.245    
(.177) 
At most two years 
university*10
3   
.279*   
(.135) 
6.471   
(4.408) 
.556    
(.633) 
.225   
(.288) 
1.462   
(.898) 
.016    
(.198) 
At least two years 
university*10
3   
.190   
(.112) 
.619   
(3.579) 
.509    
(.496) 
.305   
(.197) 
–.305   
(.885) 
.201    
(.184) 
   
B. Five years after arrival 
Age at immigration*10




–.020    
(.114) 
1.179   
(.936) 
.480*     
(.110)   
  .197   
(.180) 
Female*10
3     –.319 
(.274) 
–6.645   
(8.326) 
–1.378   
(1.099) 
–11.2   
(10.47) 
–1.605   
(.963) 
3.710*   
(1.877) 
Married*10
3     –827* 
(.406) 
–10.14   
(14.51) 
–4.933*   
(1.641) 
–40.69*   
(16.031) 
–7.581*   
(2.332) 
–7.100*   
(3.263) 
Number of children*10
3     –.397* 
(.134) 
–11.33*   
(4.029) 
–.973   
(.616) 
–14.69*   
(5.334) 
1.441   
(.755) 
–3.636*   
(1.118) 
Ref. Compulsory school             
At most two years high 
school*10
3   
–1.032 
(.647) 
–2.852   
(20.24) 
–4.706   
(2.591) 
–27.11   
(22.60) 
–1.3917    
(2.395) 
–11.53*   
(4.858) 
At least two years high 
school*10
3   
.627 
(.513) 
3.104   
(16.40) 
2.671   
(2.127) 
22.41   
(18.71) 
–1.2301   
(2.039) 
  10.19*   
(3.631) 
At most two years 
university*10
3   
1.074* 
(.483) 
12.81   
(15.56) 
4.663*   
(2.014) 
54.01*    
(17.91) 
1.167   
(2.311) 
24.09*   
(4.196) 
At least two years 
university*10
3   
2.434* 
(.483) 
  8.038   
(14.56) 
8.952*   
(2.172) 
74.00*   
(17.96) 
  1.249   
(2.543) 
34.81*   
(5.501)   
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All coefficients and its standard errors have been multiplied 
by 10
3 . The sample consists of refugee migrants age 25–60 at arrival that immigrated 1990–1994 (N=66,871). All 
regressions control for municipality, year of arrival and ethnic group fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 




Table 2 OLS estimates of the effect of initial inequality on the probability of being 
hospitalized in five years after arrival   
  Inequality measure 









A. Total sample   










B. Education       






















C. Gender       






















D. Age at immigration       




















Municipality FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Contry of origin FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  of arrival FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Inequality is measured at the (initial) municipality level 
using disposable income. The sample consists of refugee migrants age 25–60 at arrival that immigrated 
1990–1994. The regressions controls with dummies for age at immigration, educational attainment (five 
levels), gender, marital status, missing values, and linearly for disposable income (and its square) and family 
size. The regressions include municipality level controls for the unemployment rate, population size, and 
share  of  university  educated;  all  entered  in  logs.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  the  municipality  level  in 




Table 3 OLS estimates of the effect of initial inequality on the probability of being 
hospitalized in five years after arrival by type of diagnosis  
  Inequality measure 

















–.016   
(.018) 
[–9.0%] 
Mental disorders (Outcome mean .026) 
 







.013   
(.022) 
[7.4%] 
Cancer (Outcome mean .017) 
 










Ischemic heart diseases (Outcome mean .009) 
 




.001    
(.002) 
[4.3%] 
.013   
(.011) 
[21.3%] 
Diabetes (Outcome mean .006) 
 
–.034   
(.051) 
[–17.6%] 
.001   
(.002) 
[6.5%] 
–.006   
(.010) 
[–14.7%] 
Municipality FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Contry of origin FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  of arrival FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Inequality is measured at the (initial) municipality level 
using disposable income. The sample consists of refugee migrants age 25–60 at arrival that immigrated 
1990–1994  (N=66,871).  The  regressions  controls  with  dummies  for  age  at  immigration,  educational 
attainment (five levels), gender, marital status, missing values, and linearly for disposable income (and its 
square) and family size. The regressions include municipality level controls for the unemployment rate, 
population  size,  and  share  of  university  educated;  all  entered  in  logs.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  the 
municipality level in parentheses. ** = significant at 5 % level; * = significant at 10 % level. 36 
 
 
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis of the effect of initial inequality on the probability of 
being hospitalized in five years after arrival (OLS estimates)    
  Inequality measure 

















A. Change in specification        






















       
B. Change in outcome        
Pr(Sick leave in year five after arrival) 








Pr(Died in five years after arrival) 








Average number of days hospitalized  
(Outcome mean 3.62) 






       
C. Non-linear effects        
Inequality 
 
.284   
(.897) 
–.007    
(.014) 
–.066    
(.302) 






Municipality FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Contry of origin FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  of arrival FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Inequality is measured at the (initial) municipality level 
using disposable income. The sample consists of refugee migrants age 25–60 at arrival that immigrated 
1990–1994  (N=66,871).  The  regressions  controls  with  dummies  for  age  at  immigration,  educational 
attainment (five levels), gender, marital status, missing values, and linearly for disposable income (and its 
square) and family size. The regressions include municipality level controls for the unemployment rate, 
population  size,  and  share  of  university  educated;  all  entered  in  logs.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  the 






Table 5 IV estimates of the effect of average exposure to inequality on the probability 
of being hospitalized within a five year period after arrival    
  Inequality measure 









A. Total sample   










B. Education       






















C. Gender       






















D. Age at immigration       




















Municipality FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Contry of origin FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  of arrival FE:s  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes:  Each  cell  represents  a  separate  regression.  The  endogenous  variable  is  an  individual’s  average 
exposure to inequality starting in the year of arrival and ending five years later. The excluded instrument is 
the assigned inequality level. Inequality is measured at the municipality level using disposable income. The 
sample  consists  of  refugee  migrants  age  25–60  at  arrival  that  immigrated  1990–1994.  The  regressions 
controls with dummies for age at immigration, educational attainment (five levels), gender, marital status, 
missing values, and linearly for disposable income (and its square) and family size. The regressions include 
municipality level controls for the unemployment rate, population size, and share of university educated; all 
entered in logs. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. ** = significant at 5 % 
level; * = significant at 10 % level. 
 